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Abstract
A key requirement for the start of many entrepreneurial businesses is private equity or venture capital
financing. In the traditional approach to entrepreneurial investment analysis, an entrepreneur starts a new venture
and a venture capitalist finances the new venture when business return exceeds the financial opportunity cost for
comparable risk―the cost of capital for the new venture. The real options literature recommends that entrepreneurs
delay business start due to investment irreversibility until business return reaches a threshold greater than the cost of
capital. In this paper, we show that for new ventures with modest earnings volatility, an entrepreneur starts his/her
business before return exceeds the cost of capital. We identify the circumstances in which the cost of capital is an
unduly conservative return benchmark for the start of a new business and discuss the empirical implications of our
findings.
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Introduction
The discovery of business opportunities is an essential feature of entrepreneurship (Shane,
2003). Audretsch (1995) reports evidence that entrepreneurs often identify these opportunities
from knowledge that university researchers or R&D units of large corporations generate but
leave uncommercialized due to resource constraints or other impediments. Capital costs often
exceed the financial resources of entrepreneurs in manufacturing and in innovative growth
industries such as information and biotechnology (Shane, 2008). In these industries, private
equity or venture capital financing is a key requirement for starting a new business. In traditional
entrepreneurial investment analysis, an entrepreneur starts a new business and a venture
capitalist finances the new business when return exceeds the financial opportunity cost for
comparable risk―the cost of capital for the new venture (Metrick, 2006). In this approach, the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist have the same outlook on business start which belies the
complexity of the relation between them.
Our research identifies a key difference in risk perception between entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists that impedes the start of new businesses. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
see risk in different ways. In fact, their views are so different as to be opposite. For the
entrepreneur, risk decreases the appeal of starting a new business and increases the return
threshold for doing so. On the other hand, risk increases the value of a new venture’s option
features which increases the price that a venture capitalist pays for fractional equity ownership
and decreases the expected return he/she will accept. The cost of capital embodies the venture
capitalist’s financial perspective on risk but not the entrepreneur’s business investment
perspective that includes an assessment of the option to time the start of the new business.
The primary decision maker that we investigate is the entrepreneur for start of a new
business. We presume, for the most part, that the venture capitalist is ready to invest in the equity
of a new venture at the request of the entrepreneur at a price that just compensates for risk. The
supply of entrepreneurial opportunities is limited and venture capital funding is unconstrained.
Alternatively, as either entrepreneurial ideas or the supply of venture capital funds waxes and
wanes in the economy, relative bargaining power shifts to or from the entrepreneur relative to the
venture capitalist. Because of their different views on risk, we identify the types of new ventures
most likely to be funded and in what circumstances.
Unlike the traditional approach to entrepreneurial investment analysis that requires the cost
of capital as a return benchmark for new business start, the real options1 literature recommends
that entrepreneurs delay business start until return exceeds the cost of capital. McDonald and
Siegal (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) base their investment timing analysis on economic
1

Because the timing of business investments and disinvestments in a dynamic setting is equivalent to exercising
financial options, the study of business investments and disinvestments with modern tools of financial economics is
referred to as “real options.” See McDonald and Siegal (1986) for early research on investment timing and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) for an introduction to real options methods.
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models with an exogenous new venture cost of capital that is invariant to profit volatility. They
model the start decision for a new business as the exercise of a perpetual call option. Investment
irreversibility forces the entrepreneur to delay business start until return exceeds the cost of
capital and net present value (NPV) is positive. However, standard call option pricing (Galai and
Masulis, 1976) shows that volatility increases the expected payoff relative to the expected cost of
buying an asset through the exercise of a call option. An increase in payoff relative to cost is a
leverage (risk) reduction that decreases expected option return. Because a new venture is an
option to start an operating business, its expected return―the cost of capital for the new
venture―decreases with volatility. This decrease represents the venture capitalist’s attraction to
risk which contrasts with the entrepreneur’s aversion to risk that a new business creates. Our
approach differs from McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) because we
determine the cost of capital endogenously rather than impose it exogenously.
Since options features are a primary determinant of a new venture’s value, the relation
between the cost of capital and earnings volatility is of critical importance in the entrepreneurial
decision to start a new business. We find that when earnings volatility is modest, the cost of
capital for the new venture is great and exceeds the return threshold for new business start that
the entrepreneur sets to maximize value.2 An entrepreneur should not delay business start until
return exceeds the cost of capital. On this point, our results contradict current recommendations
in the finance literature and show that both the real options and the traditional approaches to
entrepreneurial business start decisions are improperly conservative.
If the cost of capital is an unreliable benchmark for the start of a new business, is there better
guidance available for entrepreneurs? One possibility is for an entrepreneur to mimic the
expansion decisions of otherwise similar operating businesses. To investigate this benchmark,
we compare the value maximizing return threshold for start of a new business with the value
maximizing return threshold for expansion of an otherwise similar already operating business. 3
We find that the motivation to invest is stronger for managers of already operating
businesses in their expansion decisions compared to entrepreneurs in their business start
decisions. If managers of operating businesses do not expand, they face a reduction in the dollar
value of future expansion investments upon improved profitability. Today’s expansion
investments, even if only modestly profitable, make the business larger which reduces
constraints, such as financing, on future expansion investments. This “size imperative”
encourages current investment. Since there are no assets, new ventures effectively have no size
and no size imperative. Thus, an entrepreneur has stronger aversion to investment irreversibility
for the start of an operating business than does the manager of an already operating business for

2

The entrepreneur delays the start of an operating business until the hypothetical return to that business equals a
return threshold. In this paper, we refer to that return threshold as the entrepreneur’s value maximizing return
threshold for business start.

3

The manager of an already operating business expands profitability with incremental investment when business
return exceeds the “value maximizing return threshold for business expansion.” On the other hand, if business return
falls below this threshold, the manager suspends growth until profitability improves.
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expansion. Under the same conditions, an entrepreneur delays the start of a new business when
the manager of an already operating business expands.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that value maximizing profit thresholds for investment are
greater in earlier compared to later stages of a sequential investment. While our model of timing
the start of a new business and expansion of an already operating business also has this feature, it
arises from different economic forces. Dixit and Pindyck investigate a sequentially staged
investment, which, when all stages are complete, generates operating income. They give the
example of oil production where oil is first discovered through exploration and then oil is
recovered with wells and pipelines before the investment earns a profit. With only one remaining
development stage, the investment cost from the first stage is sunk and does not impact the
decision to complete the investment in the second stage. Because the remaining investment cost
in the second stage is lower than the sum of investment costs in the two stages, the decision to
proceed with the investment in the second stage does not require dollar profit as great. The fact
that the dollar profit threshold is not normalized with remaining investment costs limits their
findings. Instead, we compare return thresholds between the start of a new business and
expansion of an already operating business which does not have this limitation.
The literature on new venture start identifies various factors that influence the investment
decisions of entrepreneurs: partial reversibility,4 the price of capital,5 learning,6 capital stock
adjustment costs,7 construction lags,8 resolution of uncertainty,9 agency costs,10 growth
constraints including financing,11 and strategic investment induced by competition.12 All these
factors modify the degree to which an entrepreneur defers an irreversible investment. However,
apart from Blazenko and Pavlov (2009), none of these factors reverses the deferral option to
induce investment earlier than recommended by cost of capital analysis in a dynamic setting.
Blazenko and Pavlov (2009) show that managers of operating businesses accelerate an
indefinite sequence of expansion investments that have constant returns to scale and that neither
displace nor impair future returns. The value maximizing return threshold for expansion of an
already operating business is always less than the cost of capital. Managers expand their
businesses before return reaches the cost of capital. Our results differ because we study a new
venture which, unlike an already operating business, is not subject to the size imperative. Since a
new venture does not yet have operations, the start option for the new venture is a larger portion
of value than is the expansion option for an already operating business. This greater option value
makes the cost of capital for a new venture exceptionally sensitive to earnings volatility. When
4

Kandel and Pearson ( 2002).
Abel et al. (1996).
6
Bergemann and Hege (1998), Grenadier and Weiss (1997), Lévesque et al. (2009).
7
Abel and Eberly (1994).
8
Aguerrevere (2003).
9
Berk et al. (2004), MacMillan et al. (2006), Choi et al. (2008).
10
Bergemann and Hege (1998), Grenadier and Wang (2005).
11
Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Mauer and Triantis (2005), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010), Blazenko and Pavlov
(2009), Pavlov et al. (2004).
12
Cottrell and Sick (2002), Dewit and Leahy (2006).
5
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earnings volatility is great and the entrepreneur’s aversion to business start is correspondingly
high, the entrepreneur delays business start.
In section I, we model a new venture as a perpetual call option on an operating business. We
derive the return threshold for start of a new business and compare it to the expansion threshold
of an otherwise similar operating business. In Section II, we derive the new venture cost of
capital and compare it to the value maximizing return threshold for start of a new business.
Section III presents comparative static results and discusses empirical implications. Section IV
concludes and offers directions for future research.
I. Return Thresholds for the Start of a New Business Versus Expansion
Shane (2003) reviews the evidence from the entrepreneurship literature that individual
characteristics such as employment, income, and marital status are primary determinants of the
opportunity costs that entrepreneurs face in starting a new business. In the context of the
knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2009), a prospective entrepreneur
might be employed in a new knowledge institution, like a research university or the R&D unit of
a large firm, and weighs his/her opportunity costs with the possibility of embarking on a business
prospect left uncommercialized by his/her employer. Opportunities arise exogenously with little
or no cost to the entrepreneur who awaits minimum profitability before starting a new business.
For our purposes, a new venture is a business opportunity not yet economically viable and
the “entrepreneur” is the economic agent that directs the new venture. In contrast, the “manager”
is the economic agent that has already made the irreversible investment that starts an operating
business that converts potential earnings into actual earnings. Thereafter, the manager has an
indefinite option to expand his/her business.
A. The Operating Business
Because a new venture is a call option on an operating business, before we determine the
value of the new venture, we first find the value of the operating business that would exist if the
entrepreneur hypothetically started the business immediately. We use Blazenko and Pavlov’s
(2009) model of an operating business where the manager has an indefinite sequence of
expansion options. Profit growth requires these expansion investments.13 The manager can
suspend business expansion at any time upon inadequate profitability and then restart upon
improved profitability. This model has the attraction that it has a closed-form solution for the
value maximizing return threshold for expansion of the operating business.

13

Our use of Blazenko and Pavlov’s (2009) model for an operating business does not restrict the generality of our
results. Our conclusions arise from the primary result that the cost of capital for a new venture increases without
bound as volatility of potential earnings approaches zero (see, section II B). Because this result has an analogy in
standard option pricing for call options, our results are robust to changing the underlying operating business that one
might use. We uncover novel results not because of the nature of the operating business that we model, but because
we endogenously determine the cost of capital rather than adopt it as an exogenous constant.
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A manager controls the level of a firm’s capital stock,14 Bt > 0 , by undertaking irreversible
expansion investments at the maximum instantaneous rate 0 ≤ dBt Bt ≤ gdt . The maximum
uncompounded per annum rate of capital growth is the parameter g. A constant returns to scale
technology with stochastic return on capital, Yt , generates operating cash flow that we denote as

X t . That is, X t = Yt Bt . When the manager expands the business, the growth rate of cash flow
equals that of capital g. On the other hand, when the manager suspends growth, then neither
capital, B, nor cash flow, X t , grows.
The return on capital follows a non-growing geometric diffusion, dYt Yt = σ dz , where, σ is
volatility of both the return on capital and operating cash flow, X t , and dz is a Wiener process.
There is no growth in capital efficiency for expansion investments or the existing business. That
is, the return on capital does not grow,15 E Y%t  = Y0 . Irreversible investment is the sole cost of
growth without restriction or other costs.
X
, rather than the
B
return on capital plus a growth factor Y+g. Return on capital plus a growth factor is the business
return for a hypothetical investment with spontaneous profit growth―like a stand of timber that
does not require ongoing capital investment.16 However, this is not the nature of the investment
we study. In our case, profit growth requires capital growth. Either in-place assets or expansion
investments generate a non-growing perpetual stream of expected profit, Y, per dollar of capital.
Regardless of the magnitude of the constraint on capital investment, g, business return, the
internal rate of return (IRR), satisfies Y/IRR-1=0 which means that IRR=Y.
V(X) denotes the value of the operating business―its sellable value after the start of the new
business by the entrepreneur. This amount is equivalent to present value (PV) as opposed to net
present value (NPV) in static investment analysis. The value of the operating business, V(X), is
capital, B, times the market/book ratio which is a function of the return on capital, Y. Denote the
market/book ratio for the operating business as m(Y ) . Then, V(X)=B* m(Y ) . The value

Business return is the return on capital, cash flow divided by capital, Y ≡

maximizing return threshold for expansion, ξ * , separates the market/book ratio that we report
in Appendix A, into growth and no growth branches. Figure I depicts the market/book ratio,
m(Y ) , for a numerical example. The manager expands profitability, X, with incremental capital,
14

Capital stock includes, for example, working capital and depreciable assets. Corporate process improvements that
enhance profitability require human capital investments. While capital stock, B, can conceptually include these
investments, it then diverges from commonplace accounting for corporate assets.
15

Abel et. al (1996) show that managers invest early when they expect the price of capital to increase.

16

The static environment illustrates the point. If permanent profit growth at the rate g requires capital growth at the
rate g, then, the IRR satisfies (X-g*B)/(IRR-g)-B=0, and, IRR=Y regardless of the growth factor, g. For comparison
purposes, for spontaneous profit growth, the IRR satisfies X/(IRR-g)-B=0, and, IRR = Y+g.
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B, at the rate gdt when the return on capital exceeds the expansion boundary, Y ≥ ξ * . On the

other hand, if the return on capital falls below the expansion boundary, Y < ξ * , then manager
suspends growth until profitability improves.
B. The New Venture
In this subsection, we determine the value of a new venture as a perpetual call option on the
operating business from the previous subsection. We then determine the value maximizing return
threshold that the entrepreneur uses to start the operating business. Last, we compare the return
threshold for start of the operating business with the return threshold that the manager of the
operating business uses for expansion (that is, ξ * from the previous section).
Prior to the start of the operating business, earnings, X, are potential earnings―earnings that
would accrue if the entrepreneur hypothetically started the business immediately. Because
earnings growth requires capital growth and because the entrepreneur undertakes no capital
dX
investment prior to starting the business, we presume no earnings growth,17
= σ dz .
X
Let I >0 be the required irreversible investment that the entrepreneur uses to start the
X
operating business. Return on capital upon business start is Y = . Once the entrepreneur starts
I
the business, capital of the now operating business is this amount, B = I. Thereafter, both
earnings and capital of the operating business grow at the discretion of the manager.
Let P(X,I) be the value of the new venture prior to start, which is equivalent to NPV in a
static investment analysis. Then, P( X,I ) = Iπ(Y ) , where π(Y ) is the market/book18 ratio for
the new venture that depends on the return capital, Y. Appendix B describes how to find the
market/book ratio which is,
π (Y ) = cY α
(1)
where c is an arbitrary constant and Equation (A2) in Appendix A gives the value of the
parameter α.
C. The Value Maximizing Return Threshold for the Start of a New Business
Denote the value maximizing return threshold for start of the new business as ψ * . In the
first instance, the return on capital is below the start boundary, Y <ψ *. When the return on
capital increases to the start boundary, Y =ψ *, the entrepreneur irrevocably starts the new
business by making the dollar investment I. He/she then becomes the manager of the new
17

Alternatively, we could presume earnings growth without capital growth, like a stand of timber, without changing
the substance of our results. However, this spontaneous growth is unrealistic for most industrial and commercial
enterprises.
18
Prior to investment, “book” is the investment cost I.
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operating business. The manager expands the operating business when the return on capital
exceeds the expansion boundary, Y ≥ ξ * , and suspends expansion otherwise. When the return
on capital increases once more above the expansion boundary, the manager recommences
growth. While growth investments are irreversible, the manager’s decision to grow or not is
provisional and reversible.
Appendix B describes the value matching and smooth pasting conditions that jointly
determine c, the arbitrary constant in Equation (1), and ψ * , the value maximizing return
threshold for start of the new business. This return threshold satisfies the equation,19
λ
(r * − g ) α 
g ψ *  
(2)
ψ*=
r −

 
r − g α − 1  (1 − λ )  ξ *  
where Equation (A2) and Equation (A3) in Appendix A give expressions for the parameters α, λ,
and the value maximizing expansion boundary for the operating business, ξ * . The parameter, r,
is risk free interest rate. The parameter r* is the risk adjusted rate20 for an operating business that
hypothetically never grows. Equation (2) has no closed-form solution for ψ * , except in the
special case when the operating business never grows, g=0. Alternatively, we determine the
return threshold for start of a new business, ψ * , numerically for our analysis that follows.
For a numerical example, Figure I plots one plus21 the market/book ratio for the new venture
prior to business start, 1+ π (Y ) , and the market/book ratio for the otherwise similar operating
business, m(Y ) . As the return on capital, Y, increases from the left, convergence of the first
function to the second illustrates that the return threshold for start of the new business,
ψ* = 0.126 , exceeds the return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ξ* = 0.0927 ,
by over 300 basis points.
D. Comparing the Return Thresholds
In this subsection, we compare the value maximizing return threshold that the entrepreneur
uses to start the operating business, ψ * , to the value maximizing return threshold that the
manager of the operating business uses for expansion,

ξ *.

19

Substitute Equation (A5) into Equation (A6) to find Equation (2).

20

The risk adjusted rate for a firm that permanently does not growth is

rate r plus a risk premium

r * ≡ r + θσ x,c which is the risk free interest

θσ x ,c . The parameter θ is constant relative risk aversion for a representative investor.

σ x ,c measures business risk and equals the covariance of log earnings with the log of aggregate
consumption in the economy. For expositional simplicity, we presume a positive risk premium, θσ x ,c > 0 .
The parameter

21

Value matching in Equation (A5) says that the value of the new venture immediately prior to the start of the new
business equals the net value of the operating business immediately after the start (per one dollar of capital).
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Because the market/book ratio for the operating business, m(Y), has two branches in
Equation (A1)―for growth and no-growth―it is not obvious which branch jointly determines c
and ψ * in Equations (A5) and (A6). In Appendix C, we prove that the return threshold for start
of the new business, ψ * , is on the growth branch (presuming the contrary leads to a
mathematical contradiction). Because the return threshold for expansion of the operating
business, ξ * , separates the two branches (growth and no growth), this result establishes that the
return threshold, ψ * , for the start of the new business exceeds the return threshold for
expansion of the already operating business, ψ * ≥ ξ *.
E. Discussion
Even though expansion is an identical scaled copy of the investment that starts the business,
the value maximizing return threshold for new business start exceeds the value maximizing
return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ψ * ≥ ξ *. An entrepreneur delays the
start of the new business under the same conditions that the manager of the operating business
expands. Equivalently, the manager expands a newly started business even when profitability
falls immediately after business start, ψ * > Y ≥ ξ * . The manager expands a newly started
business even though in an earlier period―as the entrepreneur of the new venture―he/she
delayed business start.
The restriction on growth, g, encourages expansion of the operating business in order to
increase the size and dollar value of future growth investments. Future growth investments are
proportional to capital at that time. Future capital is greater and the dollar value of future growth
investments is greater, if the manager makes expansion investments now. A low expansion
boundary reflects the benefit of today’s expansion investment for future expansion investments
(that is, ξ* ≤ψ *).
The entrepreneur of the new venture does not have the same imperative to start the business
that the manager of the operating business has to expand. For the new venture, the likelihood of
any sequence of earnings increments after business start does not change with the start date of
the new business. The reason for this probabilistic feature of earnings increments is the
“memoryless” property of all Markov stochastic processes. The memoryless property says that
the probability of future earnings increments does not depend on past earnings increments. So,
firm size (that is, the capital of the operating business), is probabilistically the same at any fixed
time interval after business start. Because in-place assets do not yet exist for a new venture, there
is no imperative for the entrepreneur to start the business in the first instance. Rather, the
entrepreneur delays the start of the new business in order to avoid downside earnings risk, which
the manager of the operating business cannot avoid, having irreversibly started the business that
now generates risky earnings.
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F. Volatility and Return Thresholds
Figure II plots the entrepreneur’s return threshold for start of a business, ψ * , against
earnings volatility, σ. Volatility decreases the appeal of business start to the entrepreneur for the
same reason that start boundaries increase with volatility in McDonald and Siegel (1986) and
Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The entrepreneur avoids disappointing future earnings outcomes and
protects the value of the entrepreneurial opportunity with the delay of business start. At the same
time, delay does not prevent the entrepreneur from starting the business in the future when the
earnings potential of the new venture improves. Because downside protection is more important
than upside earnings potential for the entrepreneur, and because downside risk increases with
volatility, the return threshold for start of the business, ψ * , increases with earnings volatility, σ.
In Appendix D, we prove a number of results related to earnings volatility. First, we prove
lim ψ * = r * . This result says that for new ventures without earnings volatility, the return start
σ →0+

boundary is the same as the cost of capital for a hypothetical business that permanently does not
grow, r*. With no volatility, there is no value protection from the delay of new venture start and
the new venture return start threshold falls (see, Figure II). In addition, with no volatility, the
value maximizing expansion threshold for the already operating business also approaches the
cost of capital for a permanently non-growing business. That is, lim ξ * = r * . Without volatility,
σ →0+

there is no size benefit to expansion investment for the operating business. Without this
attraction, the expansion boundary increases (see, Figure II). Combining these two results, the
return threshold for start of the new business converges to the return threshold for expansion of
the already operating business when volatility approaches zero. That is, lim ψ * = lim ξ * = r*.
σ →0+

σ →0+

Second, we prove that the return threshold for start of a new business becomes unboundedly
great with earnings volatility. That is, lim ψ * = ∞ . This result says that value protection from
σ →∞

delaying business start increases with volatility.
These two results are essential pieces in the argument for why an entrepreneur starts a new
business when return is less than the cost of capital for businesses with low earnings volatility.
The completion of the argument requires that we derive the cost of capital for the new venture
which we do next.
II. New Venture Start Boundary Versus the New Venture Cost of Capital
A. New Venture Cost of Capital
Since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal investigation of the impact of corporate
financial structure on hurdle rates for business investment, academics and practitioners have
measured the cost of capital as the expected return on the market value of an asset. Modigliani
and Miller analyze a static business environment in which a manager permanently commits to
business expansion at a fixed per annum rate. In the dynamic business setting that we investigate,
the manager makes moment-by-moment decisions to expand the business and the entrepreneur
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makes moment-by-moment decisions to start a new business. Consequently, an entrepreneur
trained in traditional investment analysis (a “cost of capital” entrepreneur), compares business
return to the cost of capital every instant as a hurdle rate for the start of a new business.
The cost of capital is the expected return on a venture capitalist’s financial investment in a
new venture prior to business start and is also the average return that a venture capitalist earns on
a portfolio of similar new venture investments. Therefore, the cost of capital can be calculated or
estimated from observed financial market returns. In this section, we investigate the investment
errors that an entrepreneur makes by using this observable financial market return as a
benchmark to start a new business.
For a new venture prior to start, there is no business income, no capital growth, and no
expected growth in business income. Thus, the cost of capital is the expected capital gain from
the convexity of the new venture value function divided by the value of the new venture in
Equation (1). Convexity represents the option features of the new venture. We use the symbol, ω,
to represent the cost of capital for the new venture. Then,22
2
α
1 ∂  cIY  2 2
Y σ
2
ω = 2 ∂Y α
= α (α − 1)σ 2 2
cIY
2

θσ
 θσ 
2r  1 θσ x,c 
= r + x ,c +  x,c  + θσ x ,c
+ +
σ 2  2 σ 2 
2
 σ 

2

From Equation (3), we can establish a number of features of the cost of capital for the new
venture.
B. New Venture Cost of Capital Features
We identify seven features of the cost of capital for the new venture. First, the cost of
capital, ω, decreases with earnings volatility, σ. The expected return on the new venture prior to
start is the expected return on a call option: the option to start the business. In standard option
pricing (Galai and Masulis, 1976), volatility decreases call option risk which decreases expected
return. Thus, volatility dissipates leverage and decreases the new venture’s cost of capital, ω.
This inverse relation between volatility and return is critical to the performance evaluation
of venture capital portfolios. Skewness and volatility are related because in a lognormal
distribution―such as the distribution for the return on capital, Y% ―volatility increases positive
skewness. A large literature documents positive skewness for new venture returns and interprets
positive skewness as great risk and, therefore, looks for high returns (Grabowski and Vernon
1994, 1999; Grabowski et al., 2002; Kolbe et al., 1991). However, our analysis indicates that
because positive skewness arises from volatility, new ventures with great earnings volatility have
low leverage and should have low returns. For a venture capital fund with a fixed dollar amount
to invest, a large number of low volatility, low priced, new venture investments should have a
22

Use Ito’s lemma, and substitute Equation (1) to find Equation (3).
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greater return than a small number of high volatility, high priced, and highly skewed new venture
investments.
Second, for unbounded volatility, the cost of capital for the new venture approaches the cost
of capital for a hypothetical non-growing business. That is, lim ω = r*. Figure II depicts this
σ →∞

result for a numerical example. Unbounded volatility effectively eliminates leverage and
decreases the risk of a new venture to that of a permanently non-growing business.
Third, as volatility approaches zero, the cost of capital becomes unboundedly large. That is,
lim ω = ∞ . Figure II depicts this result for a numerical example. Both the expected capital gain
σ →0+

from the curvature of the value function (the numerator of ω) and business value (the
denominator of ω) approach zero as volatility approaches zero. Value approaches zero more
rapidly than does dollar risk and, therefore, the cost of capital increases without bound as
volatility approaches zero. Low volatility decreases business value which makes risk per dollar
invested exceptionally great.
Fourth, the return on capital for the new venture, Y, does not change the cost of capital. The
return on capital changes dollar risk, the numerator of Equation (3), in exact proportion with
option value, the denominator of Equation (3), which leaves the cost of capital unchanged. This
observation means that latent profitability has no impact on risk prior to the start of a new
business. This result is quite distinct from the underlying operating business. Blazenko and
Pavlov (2009) show that the cost of capital for the operating business increases as the return on
capital Y increases from zero but decreases with the return on capital, Y, when the return on
capital is high.
Fifth, the cost of capital exceeds the riskless rate, ω ≥ r , and equals the riskless rate only for
zero covariance risk. Of course, this result means that the venture capitalist requires
compensation for covariance risk, σ x,c > 0 .
Sixth, capital to start the business, I, has no impact on the cost of capital. Equivalently,
investment irreversibility is not a determinant of the cost of capital. The reason for this result is
that the new venture entrepreneur can time the start of the new business and faces investment
irreversibility only at his/her discretion.
∂ω
∂ 2ω
> 0 and
> 0 , which says that business risk increases the cost
Finally, 23
2
∂ θσ x ,c 
∂ θσ x ,c 
of capital for the new venture more than proportionately. If the operating business is risky, then
option leverage makes the new venture dramatically more risky. As an illustration of this
leverage, at the far right side of Figure III, when covariance risk is 10%, the cost of capital for a
non-growing operating business is r* ≡ r + θσ x,c =15%, whereas, the cost of capital for the new
venture is close to 70%. The option features of a new venture increase both risk and required
return appreciably over those of an operating business. However, a great financial return does not
23

Apart from their signs, these derivatives are of little economic interest and, therefore, we do not report them.
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mean that the return threshold for start of a new business should be correspondingly great. We
compare the value maximizing return threshold for start of a new business with its cost of capital
in the next subsection.
C. New Venture Start Boundary Versus the Cost of Capital
In this subsection, we compare the value maximizing return threshold for start of a new
business with its cost of capital. First, we make this comparison for new ventures with modest
volatility. In Appendix D, we show that lim ψ * = r * and lim ω = ∞ . These two results means
σ →0+

σ →0+

that for modest earnings volatility, σ, the cost of capital for the new venture exceeds the return
start threshold for start of the new business. That is, ω >ψ * . The numerical example in Figure II
illustrates that the cost of capital for the new venture, ω, exceeds the return threshold for start of
the new business, ψ * , when earnings volatility σ is less than 36.5% per annum.
Second, we compare the return threshold for start of a new business with the cost of capital
for the new venture when earnings volatility is great. In Appendix D, we show that lim ψ * = ∞
σ →∞

and lim ω = r*. These results mean that for new ventures with high earnings volatility, σ, the
σ →∞

return threshold for start of the new business exceeds the cost of capital for the new venture. That
is, ψ * > ω . The value maximizing entrepreneur delays the start of the new business compared to
an entrepreneur who uses the cost of capital as a return benchmark when starting a new business.
The combination of these two sets of results indicates that for modest profit volatility, a new
venture entrepreneur starts a new business before return reaches the cost of capital. For great
profit volatility, an entrepreneur delays the start of a new business until return exceeds the cost of
capital. The first result is opposite to the recommendation from the real options literature to defer
the start of a new business due to investment irreversibility (McDonald and Siegal, 1986; and
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The second result indicates that our previous finding (Blazenko and
Pavlov, 2009) that managers expand their businesses before the return on capital reaches the cost
of capital does not apply to the start of new businesses. With high earnings volatility, a value
maximizing entrepreneur delays the new start of a new business until the return on capital
exceeds the cost of capital.
D. Determinants of the Cost of Capital and the Return Threshold for New Venture Start
Different economic forces determine the cost of capital for the new venture, ω, and the
return threshold for start of the new business, ψ * . The primary determinant of the return
threshold for start of the new business, ψ * , is irreversibility of the initial investment, I. Earnings
volatility, σ, increases both downside earnings risk and upside earnings potential but because the
entrepreneur is more concerned with downside risk (which he/she avoids with the delay of
business start), the return threshold for start of the new business, ψ * , increases with earnings
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volatility, σ. On the other hand, the primary determinant of the cost of capital for the new
venture is leverage. Volatility, σ, dissipates leverage which decreases the cost of capital, ω.
Because volatility decreases the cost of capital but increases the return threshold for start of
the new business and because these schedules cross, the cost of capital, ω, exceeds the return
threshold for start of the new business, ψ * , for modest volatility, σ. The entrepreneur starts the
new business before return exceeds the cost of capital. On the other hand, the return threshold for
start of the new business, ψ * , exceeds the cost of capital, ω, when earnings volatility is great. In
this case, the entrepreneur defers the start of the new business until business return exceeds the
cost of capital.
E. Discussion
Why does a traditional “cost of capital” entrepreneur erroneously compare business return,
Y, to the cost of capital, ω, when making decision to start a new business and then become a
value maximizing manager when expanding the business (as implied in the valuation of the
already operating business in section I)? The cost of capital for the new venture, ω, is
independent of the manager’s business expansion strategy during the operating phase of the
business. The value of the new venture has the form given by Equation (1) regardless of the
manager’s investment strategy in the operating phase of the business, which determines only the
parameter “c.” Smooth pasting and value matching conditions in Equations (A5) and (A6)
determine “c” for the value maximizing start of a new business that is subsequently expanded
using a value maximizing return threshold for expansion. A non-value-maximizing start with a
non-value-maximizing subsequent expansion will have a different set of requirements which
together determine the parameter “c” and the return threshold for business start. Nonetheless, the
constant “c” cancels in the numerator and the denominator in the determination of the cost of
capital for the new venture, ω, in Equation (3). This cancelation means that the cost of capital for
the new venture, ω, is invariant to the manager’s investment strategy in the operating phase of
the business. This discussion highlights the fact that our primary result does not depend on the
model we use for the operating business.
F. Hurdles Rates for Business Stages
In this subsection, we discuss the business development stages that we model and the hurdle
rates between them. Figure II represents our model of three distinct business stages: venture
capital investment, start of the new business, and expansion of the operating business. These
business stages require distinct hurdle rates between them. First, a venture capitalist uses the cost
of capital as a financial criterion for equity investment in the new venture. Because the venture
capitalist makes a financial investment, the hurdle rate for venture capital investment is a
financial rate―the cost of capital. Figure II illustrates that for a prospective new business with
earnings volatility of 20% per annum, the venture capital rate is 25.5%. Venture capitalists
expect this rate of return to purchase shares of the new venture from the entrepreneur. Next, at
the point of starting the business, the return threshold for business start is ψ * =12.6%. Low
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volatility makes the cost of capital great and the start boundary low, 25.5%>12.6%. Last, the
hurdle rate for expansion of the operating business is less than the return threshold for start of the
new business, ψ* =12.6% > ξ* = 9.27%. The entrepreneur can start the new business only once
but can expand it any time thereafter and, thus, the return threshold for start of the new business
is more demanding than is the return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ψ * ≥ ξ *.
G. Empirical Estimates of Earnings Volatility
Whether or not the value maximizing return threshold for start of a new business, ψ * ,
exceeds the cost of capital, ω, depends on the characteristics of the operating business and the
economic environment. Figure II illustrates that the cost of capital for the new venture exceeds
the return threshold for start of the new business when volatility, σ, is less than 36.5%. It strikes
us that this is a relatively large number and, therefore, we expect that a large fraction of
entrepreneurs start their new businesses before return reaches the cost of capital. In order to
benchmark this number, we undertake a modest empirical analysis using annual earnings before
interest tax depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) for fiscal years 1950 to 2008 from the
COMPUSTAT database of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms. Firms on the COMPUTSTAT
database are primarily operating businesses with positive revenues rather than firms in their
development phase. Thus, in using COMPUTSTAT companies, we make the presumption that
an entrepreneur analyses the start decision anticipating that his/her new venture will become an
operating business.
We discard firms that do not have at least five consecutive years of positive EBITDA,
leaving a sample of 4492 firms. Firm by firm, we calculate from ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, residual standard deviation from detrended logarithmic EBIDTA as our estimate24 of
earnings volatility, σ̂ . We find that the median value of earnings volatility, σ̂ , across the 4492
firms is 46.0% and decile break points are 15.4, 22.7, 29.9, 37.6, 46.0, 56.6, 67.7, 80.5, and
103.3%. Interpolating, approximately 38.5% of these firms have an estimated earnings volatility,
σ̂ , less than 36.5%.
III. Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications

24

The regression for firm i is, log(EBITDAi,t ) = a + g *t + εi,t where t is an index that represents the fiscal year. The
T

standard deviation of the error term is our estimate of earnings volatility, σˆ i =

∑εˆ

2
i,t

(T − 2) , where T is the

t =1

number of years (from 5 to 59) in the time series for firm i. Operating businesses seldom have negative EBITDA
and, thus, the requirement for positive EBITDA is not critical to the conclusions that we make. We find little
evidence that σ̂ varies with T (results not reported) which suggests that earnings volatility does not depend on the
age of a business and that the earnings volatility of COMPUSTAT firms is not an unreasonable proxy for the
earnings volatility that an entrepreneur can expect upon the start of a new business.
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In this section, we combine comparative statics with testable implications from our new
business start study. Often, empirical tests of real options models of investment timing have been
undertaken without due care. For example, because profit thresholds for new venture start
increase with profit volatility, Folta et al. (2003) conclude that volatility discourages the start of
new businesses. However, this conclusion does not recognize that volatility impacts not only the
profit threshold for start of a new business, but also the stochastic process for profitability
changes. For realistic levels of profit volatility, Sarkar (2000) shows that volatility increases the
probability of reaching a value maximizing profit threshold that itself increases with volatility.
This result means that volatility encourages rather than discourages the start of new businesses.
In prior sections, we show that differences exist for investment timing between new
businesses and existing businesses. Based on these findings, in the current section, we develop
testable implications for the study of new businesses when benchmarked against incumbent
businesses in an industry. These implications cannot be derived from the existing real options
literature which assumes that new ventures and operating businesses are essentially the same.
A. Industry Entry
A number of testable implications arise from our finding that the return threshold for start of
a new business exceeds the return threshold for expansion of an already operating business,
ψ * ≥ ξ *. First, because incumbent firms in an industry accept more marginal investments while
entrepreneurs of new ventures hold out for greater profitability before business start, when an
entrepreneur does start a new business, it is on average more profitable than an otherwise similar
incumbent in the industry. Equivalently, because the market/book ratio depends on profitability,
the market/book ratio for a newly started business should exceed that of an otherwise similar
incumbent in the industry.
Second, as an industry recovers from a recession and corporate earnings improve from
depressed levels, incumbent firms expand before industry entry by new businesses becomes
commonplace. Empirically, the ratio of operating profit (as well as other measures of business
activity) for new entrants compared to incumbents should fall in the early stages of the business
cycle, as incumbent businesses expand and entrepreneurs of new ventures defer industry entry.
This ratio increases only as the industry approaches the peak of the business cycle and new
business entry becomes more frequent.
B. Volatility and the Difference in Return Thresholds
In Figure II, the increasing difference between the return threshold for the start of a business,
ψ *, and the return threshold for expansion of an already operating business, ξ * , as earnings
volatility, σ , increases has a number of testable implications. First, the profitability difference
between new businesses and incumbent businesses in an industry should be increasing in the
earnings volatility of the industry.
Second, the increasing difference between these return thresholds indicates that volatility
encourages the expansion of operating businesses relative to the start of new businesses.
Empirically, the ratio of industry growth from new businesses relative to incumbent businesses
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should be decreasing in the earnings volatility of that industry. Similarly, if earnings volatility is
not constant (as we assume in our model) but stochastic, then in periods of high earnings
volatility, industry growth should arise to a relatively greater extent from incumbent businesses
compared to new businesses.
C. The New Venture Cost of Capital Versus Volatility
We hypothesize an inverse relation between the new venture cost of capital and volatility.
This hypothesis arises from the option pricing result of Galai and Masulis (1976) that says that
call option returns relate inversely to volatility. Since this result is not widely recognized in the
finance literature, it is not surprising that it has not been tested for venture capital investments.
However, the venture capital market represents a natural experiment for this hypothesis since a
larger fraction of new venture value is option dependent than is the case for already operating
businesses. According to Kolbe et al. (1991), venture capitalists prefer positively skewed returns
with the potential for high payoff. Because skewness arises from volatility, option pricing theory
suggests that venture capitalists will pay more for the common equity of new ventures that have
high volatility. A high price implies a low rate of return which is the inverse relation between
volatility and return that Galai and Masulis propose. This discussion suggests the empirical
proposition that returns to venture capital funds should be high for low priced investments with
low volatility and low positive skewness. A difficulty in testing this proposition in the venture
capital market is the measurement of profit volatility. Since a new venture prior to
commercialization may have expenses but no revenues, earnings volatility cannot be calculated
or estimated. Thus, testing requires a proxy for profit volatility. One possibility is the ex-post
earnings volatility of otherwise similar operating businesses as, for example, we estimate in
section II.
In periods of constrained venture capital financing, the views of venture capitalists on risk
will tend to dominate those of entrepreneurs in the venture capital market to determine the type
of entrepreneurial businesses that are financed and started. The decrease in the cost of capital, ω,
with respect to profit volatility, σ, in Figure II indicates that venture capitalists have a preference
for high volatility new ventures that have returns with high positive skewness. Consequently, in
periods of constrained venture capital financing, we expect that venture capitalists will focus
their financing on industries with high profit volatility. On the other hand, in periods when
venture capital financing is more available, the views of entrepreneurs on risk will have
relatively greater influence on the types of new ventures that are financed. The increase in the
return threshold for new venture start, ψ * , with respect to profit volatility, σ, indicates that
entrepreneurs have a preference for low volatility new ventures. Thus, in periods of less
constrained access to venture capital financing, we expect that venture capitalists will finance
relatively more new ventures from industries with low profit volatility.
D. Business Risk and Credit Constraints
The difference in return thresholds for start of a new business versus expansion of an already
operating business in Figure III as business risk, θσ x,c , increases suggests testable hypotheses.
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Recall that θ measures risk aversion for the financial economy and σ x,c is a covariance risk
specific to a particular business. The product, θσ x,c , is a risk premium that venture capitalists
demand for risk. Both the return threshold for start of a new business, ψ * , and the return
threshold for expansion of an already operating business,

ξ * , increase with business risk, θσ x,c .

For a greater risk premium, θσ x,c , the underlying operating business is less attractive to venture
capitalists and both the return threshold for start of the new business and the return threshold for
expansion of the operating business increase. Except when the risk premium, θσ x,c , is close to
zero, the curves that depict these return thresholds versus the risk premium, θσ x,c , in Figure III
are close to parallel. This observation means that the type of risk that venture capitalists price in
financial markets has little impact on relative industry growth between incumbents and new
entrants. For example, in a period where investors are more risk averse (that is, θ is great), a
period of constrained credit possibly, relative industry growth does not change between
incumbents and new entrants in the industry.
E. Growth
In Figure IV, the return threshold for start of a new business, ψ * , as well as the return
threshold for expansion of an operating business, ξ * , decrease with growth, g. Growth increases
the value of expansion options, which increases the attraction of business start to the
entrepreneur and expansion to the manager of the already operating business. Other than for
exceptionally high growth rates, the curves depicting these return thresholds in Figure IV are
close to parallel. Empirically, this observation means that regardless of whether an industry is
high or low growth, the relative increase in asset size over a period for incumbent firms versus
new entrants in the industry should be the same.
F. The Riskless Interest Rate
In Figure V, the return threshold for start of a new business, ψ * , and the return threshold
for expansion of an already operating business, ξ * , both increase with the riskless rate, r. The
riskless rate increases investors’ opportunity costs which decreases the attraction of the
underlying business and increases both the return threshold for the start of a new business and
the return threshold for expansion of an already operating business. However, because the
riskless rate in our model, r, is in real rather than nominal form, and because real rates
historically do not vary as significantly as suggested by the horizontal axis of Figure V, the effect
of interest rates on the start of new businesses versus expansion of already operating businesses
is unlikely to be empirically observable.
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IV. Conclusion and Future Research
Graham and Harvey (2001, 2002) and Farragher et al. (1999) suggest that while corporate
managers predominantly use traditional investment decision tools such as NPV and IRR, they
also recognize the real options features of their investments. Our research suggests that because
new ventures have more extensive option features than operating businesses, entrepreneurs who
rely on traditional investment analysis to make a start decision for a new business more likely
make investment errors than mangers of already operating businesses. The timing option makes
financial returns exceptionally great and, in many cases, unduly conservative as hurdle rates for
the start of a new business. For example, for an operating business with an earnings volatility of
20% per annum (see Figure II), the expected financial return for the new venture is 25.5% and
the value maximizing return start threshold is 12.6%. The financial return is a poor
approximation to the return threshold for the start of a new business and impedes rather than
promotes value maximizing entrepreneurial investment.
The results of our study offer insights for practicing entrepreneurs looking for guidance and
heuristics on when to start a new business. First, entrepreneurs should not use venture capital
returns as a benchmark for the start of a new business. In many instances, financial returns are
unduly high due to options leverage. The return threshold for the start of a new business does not
require a premium for option leverage. Second, and for the same reason, any reasonable financial
market return plus a risk premium (for greater risk of new ventures compared to already
operating businesses) is also unduly high as a benchmark since the risk premium for options
leverage is unnecessary. Third, unless earnings volatility is extreme so that the force of deferral
for the new business is great (Figure II), an entrepreneur can look beyond the new venture stage
of his/her business and calculate the cost of capital for the operating business as a return
threshold for start of a new business. Because this return does not have a risk premium for the
start option, it is close to the value maximizing return threshold for start of the new business. The
average financial return for an operating business is closer to the return threshold for new
business start than is the rate of return on a portfolio of venture capital investments. Finally, in
cases of great profit volatility, the return threshold to start a new business requires a substantial
deferral factor to represent the combination of investment irreversibility and downside risk on
the entrepreneur’s decision to start a new business.
Our study focuses on conventional investments (e.g., plant property and equipment) without
development risk in a business environment where opportunities arise exogenously. An
entrepreneur passively awaits minimum profitability before starting a new business. In current
work (Blazenko et al., 2009), we investigate the conditions under which a new venture
entrepreneur undertakes innovative R&D investment prior to commercialization of a new
business. If development risk is great, a new venture entrepreneur endogenously invests in R&D
to enhance latent earnings prior to commercialization that only then generates actual earnings
for the business. We also determine the conditions under which an entrepreneur invests in R&D
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to enhance latent earnings before the manager of an otherwise similar already operating business
invests in R&D to increase actual earnings.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A
Blazenko and Pavlov (2009) determine the market to book ratio, m(Y ) , for an operating
business that makes growth investments up to a fraction of existing capital. The entrepreneur has
an indefinite pair of real options to commence and suspend growth at any future time. The cost
of commencing growth is irreversible capital investment. The market to book ratio, m(Y ) , with
both growth and non-growth branches is,
α



λ
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Y

−
no growth, Y<ξ*
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where, ξ * is the value maximizing return threshold for expansion of the operating business that
we describe in Equation (A3) below. The return r* ≡ r + θσ x ,c is the cost of capital for a
hypothetical business that permanently commits to no-grow where r is the riskless rate of
interest25 and θσ x,c is the risk premium for such a business. The risk premium is the product of

θ ≥ 0 (relative risk aversion for the financial economy) and σ x,c (a business specific covariance
risk between operating profit, X, and aggregate consumption in the economy, C). Smith and
Smith (2003) discuss the importance of covariance risk for the valuation of new ventures. Other
than new venture option effects, because venture capitalists make financial investments in new
ventures as part of diversified portfolios, the venture capital market “prices” covariance risk,
σ x,c , rather than volatility, σ. Covariance, σ x,c , represents the operating risk for the business
once it is started and is a constant that does not depend upon earnings volatility, σ. For
expositional purposes, we presume positive covariance, σ x,c ≥ 0 , which implies a positive risk
premium, θσ x,c ≥ 0 . The parameters α and λ equal,

25

Real options models commonly presume a constant riskless interest rate. A primary determinant of stochastic
nominal interest rates is changes in inflation expectations. The riskless rate, r, in our model is real rather than
nominal, and therefore, more likely constant. In this case, consistency between cash flows and opportunity cost rates
of return requires that corporate earnings, X, are also real rather than nominal.
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The first term on the right hand side of the market/book ratio on the no-growth branch in
Y
, is the value of a permanently non-growing business (per dollar of capital).
Equation (A1),
r*
The second term is the value of the option to begin growth for a firm currently not growing. This
option value is a net amount―the value of incremental future profitability when the business
commences growth less the cost of growth investment. The first term on the right hand side on
Y
the growth branch in Equation (A1),
, is the value of a permanently growing business (per
r * −g
dollar of capital). The second term is the expected profitability loss should the entrepreneur
suspend future growth due to low profitability. The third term is the cost of growth that
recognizes that the entrepreneur might suspend growth at times in the future.
The return threshold for expansion of the operating business is,
 r * −g   α   λ 
ξ * = r *× 
(A3)
 × α − 1 ×  λ − 1
−
r
g
 


 
This return maximizes the value of the operating business in Equation (A1). When Y ≥ ξ * ,
growth investment creates net value because the market/book ratio exceeds one. The
entrepreneur suspends growth when Y < ξ * because the market to book ratio is less than one
and net value creation from growth investment is negative.
The expansion threshold in Equation (A3) is the product of four terms. The first term, r*, is
the cost of capital for a hypothetical business that permanently commits to no-growth. The
 r * −g 
second term, 
 , represents growth leverage risk from unavoidable growing capital
 r−g 

 α 
≥ 1 , represents the
investment costs for a permanently growing business. The third term, 
 α − 1
delaying force of irreversible investment on the entrepreneur’s expansion decision. The final
 λ 
≤ 1 , represents the accelerating force of follow-on investment options for the
term, 0 ≤ 
 λ − 1 
entrepreneur’s expansion decision.
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Appendix B
To find the market to book ratio, π(Y ) , for the new venture prior to start of the operating
business, we use Goldstein and Zapatero’s (1996) valuation methodology as applied by
Goldstein et al. (2001). Because Goldstein and Zapatero employ equilibrium analysis, our use of
it determines the new venture cost of capital endogenously in section II.
The market to book ratio for the new venture, π(Y ) , satisfies the differential equation:

rπ = −θσ x ,cY π '+ Y 2π "σ

2

(A4)
2
which says that the dollar return, at the riskless rate, on the new venture’s value (left hand side)
equals an expected dollar net gain (right hand side). The expected net gain is a loss due to risk
aversion, plus an expected capital gain due to the convexity of the value function. Convexity
arises from the upside earnings potential of the business, which the entrepreneur captures with
the start of the new business, and downside earnings protection that the entrepreneur achieves by
delaying the start of the new business. For a numerical example, Figure1 depicts the convexity of
the value function, π(Y ) , that solves Equation (A4) with the conditions in Equation (A5) and
Equation (A6) below. Equation (A4) recognizes that the venture earns no income, X, prior to the
start of the new business.
Value matching and smooth pasting conditions jointly determine “c,” the arbitrary constant
in Equation (1), and ψ * , the value maximizing return threshold for start of the new business,
π (ψ *) = m(ψ*) −1
(A5)
π '(ψ*) = m'(ψ *)
(A6)
Value matching in Equation (A5) says that the value of the new venture (per dollar of
capital) immediately prior to the start of the new business equals the net value of the operating
business immediately after the start. The net calculation is the value of the operating business
less required capital. Smooth pasting in Equation (A6) says that the two value functions–pre and
post new venture start–meet one another at the new venture start boundary, ψ * , without kinks
which ensures that the new venture start boundary, ψ * , maximizes value.

Appendix C
We prove that the new venture start boundary exceeds the expansion boundary, ψ * ≥ ξ *.
Presuming the opposite, ψ * < ξ *, leads to a contradiction. Under this presumption, solving
Equation (A5) and Equation (A6) using the no growth branch of Equation (A1) leads to,

ψ*= r*

α
. Because α > 1 , this result means that ψ* > r *. At the same time, Blazenko and
α −1

Pavlov (2009) prove that r* ≥ ξ * . Combining these two results leads to, ψ* > ξ * , which
contradicts our original presumption.
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Appendix D
In this Appendix we prove two results. First, we prove lim ψ * = r * . Second, we prove that
σ →0+

when volatility becomes unbounded, the return threshold for start of the new business also
α
r−g
and lim
=1.
becomes unbounded, lim ψ * = ∞ . First, one can show that lim λ = −
σ →∞
σ
→
0
+
σ →0+
α −1
θσ x ,c
Substitute these results into Equation (A3), to reveal, lim ξ * = r * . Substitute all of these results
σ →0+

into Equation (2) to reveal that this equation is satisfied only when ψ* = r *, and therefore,

lim ψ * = r * . Second, one can show that, lim

σ →0+

σ →∞

Equation (2), because lim
σ →∞

α
= ∞ , lim λ = 0 , and lim ξ * = r * − g . From
σ →∞
σ →∞
α −1

α
= ∞ , then either lim ψ * = ∞ , limψ * = −∞ , or limψ * = 0 . The
σ →∞
σ →∞
σ →∞
α −1

latter two possibilities contradict the result we proved in Appendix C, ψ* > ξ * because

lim ξ * = r * − g > 0 . Therefore, it must be the case that lim ψ * = ∞ .
σ →∞

σ →∞
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Figure I
Value of the New Venture Prior to Business Start
and the Value of the Operating Business
Versus the Return on Capital

Figure I plots one plus the new venture market to book ratio prior to start, 1+ π (Y ) , and the
operating business market to book ratio, m(Y ) . Parameters equal g = 0.06, r = 0.05, θσ x,c = 0.05,

σ = 0.2 . As the return on capital Y increases from the left, convergence of the first function to
the second illustrates that the return threshold for new venture start, ψ* = 0.126 , exceeds the
return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ξ* = 0.0927 , by over 300 basis points.
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Figure II
Return Thresholds and the New Venture’s Cost of Capital
Versus Earnings Volatility

Figure II plots the new venture’s cost of capital, ω, the entrepreneur’s return threshold for start of
the business, ψ * , and the manager’s return threshold for expansion of the operating business,

ξ * , against earnings volatility, σ. Parameters of the model equal r= 0.05, g = 0.06, θσ x,c =0.05.
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Figure III
Return Thresholds and the New Venture’s Cost of Capital
Versus Business Risk

Figure III plots the new venture’s cost of capital, ω, the entrepreneur’s return threshold for start
of the business, ψ * , and the manager’s return threshold for expansion of the operating business,

ξ * , against business risk, θσ x,c . Parameters of the model equal r= 0.05, g = 0.06, σ = 0.2 .
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Figure IV
Return Thresholds for Start of the New Venture
and for Expansion of the Operating Business Versus Growth

Figure IV plots the entrepreneur’s return threshold for start of the business, ψ * , and the
manager’s return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ξ * , against the maximum
rate of growth, g, when growth is at the discretion of the manager. Parameters of the model equal
r= 0.05, θσ x,c =0.05, σ = 0.2 .
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Figure V
Return Thresholds for Start of the New Venture
and for Expansion of the Operating Business Versus the Riskless Interest Rate

Figure V plots the entrepreneur’s return threshold for start of the business, ψ * , and the
manager’s return threshold for expansion of the operating business, ξ * , when growth is at the
discretion of the manager versus the riskless interest rate, r. Parameters of the model equal
σ = 0.2 θσ x,c =0.05 g=0.06.
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